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Abstract
Natural resource abundance is a blessing for some countries, but a curse
for others. We show that di¤erences across countries in the degree of …scal
decentralization can contribute to this divergent outcome. Using a large panel
of countries, covering several decades and various …scal decentralization and
natural resource measures, we provide empirical support for the novel hypoth-
esis. We also study a model that combines political and market mechanisms,
under a uni…ed framework, to illustrate how natural resource booms may create
negative e¤ects in …scally decentralized nations.
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Since the in‡uential works of Sachs and Warner (1997, 1999, 2001) the so-called re-
source curse puzzle, describing an inverse relationship between resource abundance
and economic growth, has attracted considerable attention. Albeit facing criticism
(e.g., Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008), further studies have provided additional em-
pirical evidence of this phenomenon as well as various potential explanations for its
occurrence. Among these explanations (see van der Ploeg 2011 for a survey of the
literature), authors have emphasized political factors, corruption, underdeveloped le-
gal and …nancial systems, Dutch Disease mechanisms, or human-capital inhibiting
institutions.
This article contributes to this strand of the literature by further examining the
type of institutions that can contribute to the above result. More speci…cally, we fo-
cus on the level of …scal decentralization, a novel explanation. Fiscal decentralization
comprises the …nancial aspects of devolution to regional and local governments, and
it covers two main interrelated issues. The …rst is the division of spending responsi-
bilities and revenue sources between levels of government. The second is the amount
of discretion given to regional and local governments to determine their expenditure
and revenues. The de…nition that we adopt concerns both issues, yet emphasizes
the latter. Our main hypothesis is that …scally decentralized economies are more
vulnerable to the growth curse of natural resources than …scally centralized ones.
Consider, for example, the case of Venezuela versus Botswana. Both are heavily
endowed with natural resources, yet the former experienced negative growth rates in
the period of 1970-1990, while the latter presented one of the highest positive growth
rates during that time. According to the Fiscal Decentralization Indicators of the
World Bank, the economy of Venezuela is highly …scally decentralized whereas that
of Botswana is the most centralized in the sample. Let us consider other resource
abundant countries with an average share of mineral output in total GDP greater than
1
10 percent over the said period. Some of the most …scally centralized ones include
Azerbaijan, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia and Norway; all of which performed (growth-
wise) remarkably well in the periods investigated in our samples. Conversely, some
of those that are most …scally decentralized include Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico,
and Zambia; all of which performed rather poorly during the same time frames.
We o¤er a theory that combines political and market mechanisms, under a uni…ed
analytical framework, to illustrate possible income-reducing e¤ects that operate when
natural resource booms hit …scally decentralized nations. The political aspect builds
on the notion that local governments, especially if poorer and in distant regions, can
be less e¢cient at providing public goods and fall more easily prey of corruption
(e.g., see Rodriquez-Pose and Ezcurra 2011).1 If this is the case, resource windfalls
will incentivize rent-seeking behavior of local, …scally-autonomous, governments. In
addition, the model also considers a market mechanism: a natural resource boom gives
resource rich regions an advantage in the inter-regional …scal competition over factors
(borne by …scal decentralization) which they exploit to attract capital from the rest of
the economy. This leads to a capital movement towards areas that are less productive
because, as we show later, they bene…t less from agglomeration externalities (e.g.,
see Marshall 1920; Ciccone and Hall 1996) and public infrastructure.2 These two
channels contribute to the potential drop in the nation’s total output level. Raveh
(2013) studies a similar market mechanism, termed the Alberta E¤ect ; however, he
focuses on within-region e¤ects, and does not consider agglomeration economies or
public goods as inputs.
The article provides empirical evidence for the main hypothesis and key predic-
tions of the model. We adopt the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization Indicators
to add a …scal decentralization measure together with its interaction with resource
share measures to the regressions. The analysis is performed under a cross-country
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framework which enables studying the full extent of the variation in …scal decentral-
ization. For the natural endowment, we employ a variety of aggregate measures such
as primary rents, natural capital stock, as well as price-based measures, and also look
at the individual e¤ects of cropland, forest, pastureland, protected areas and sub-soil
assets.
We start with Sachs and Warner’s (1997) data and methodology. The time period
is 1970-1990 over a sample of 51 countries. Results con…rm the main hypothesis
and show that the growth curse of natural resource ampli…es in …scally decentralized
economies, and is mainly driven by sub-soil assets. These results hold when controlling
for investment, openness, institutional quality, ethnicity, terms of trade, education,
and interaction terms of ethnicity and institutional quality with the resource share
proxy.
Departing from Sachs and Warner, we thereafter employ an extended sample of
73 countries over the period of 1972-2008 to test the same hypothesis through panel
estimations, having largely the same controls as in the cross-sectional version, but in
addition controlling for country and time …xed e¤ects. The main result remains. By
undertaking further checks, we conclude that the con…rmation of our hypothesis is
robust to using various …scal decentralization and resource share measures, as well as
to di¤erent estimation methods and time periods.
Several papers within the natural resource curse literature have investigated the
institutional link. Lane and Tornell (1996) suggest that the existence of powerful
groups in conjunction with weak institutions provide an explanation for the curse.
Mehlum et al. (2006) provide additional evidence that the quality of institutions
matter. Other authors like Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Brollo et al. (2013)
o¤er empirical evidence indicating that the quality of institutions deteriorate as a
response to oil windfalls; in particular, they show that local corruption levels increase.
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In addition, some papers looked into the type of institutions that matter for the
said curse. Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) provide empirical evidence that point
at the importance of constitutional arrangements. Hodler (2006) argues that natural
resources cause con‡ict in ethnic fragmented societies that, in turn, weakens property
rights. We contribute to this literature by studying an additional related institutional
aspect: …scal decentralization; to the best of our knowledge, this article is the …rst to
do so.
Our article also relates to the debate on the e¤ect of …scal decentralization on
economic growth. Since the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), a literature has emerged
stressing the bene…ts of …scal decentralization. For example, Oates (1972) and Qian
and Roland (1998) argue that this can occur through a higher degree of discipline on
local governments and more e¢cient resource allocation. Other authors, however, ar-
gue against those bene…ts. Fiscal decentralization may introduce harming distortions
related to …scal competition that can prompt a race-to-the-bottom in local taxes and
welfare provision – Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) – or produce overinvestment in
infrastructure – Keen and Marchand (1997). As Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003)
conclude in their survey of the literature, the e¤ect still remains an open question.
We contribute to this ongoing debate by emphasizing the potential adverse e¤ects
of …scal decentralization on welfare manifested through natural resource abundance;
a channel that, to our best knowledge, has not been considered previously in this
context.
Analytical Framework
To help organize the discussion, we now construct a simple framework that illus-
trates how …scal decentralization can interact with natural resources to a¤ect income.
Speci…cally, we consider two potential channels that operate under a uni…ed setting;
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one related to political factors, and another to the optimal choice of taxation across
…scally decentralized regions.
Regions and consumers
Assume that there are  small regions in a closed and …scally decentralized economy,
each with its own government, competing for the nation’s capital stock. Regions
possess the same production and preference structure. They can di¤er in the endow-
ment of natural riches, capacity to generate public goods, and population density –
characteristics that are taken as given. Region ’s …xed population is denoted by .
These assumptions deserve some comment. First, foreign capital in‡ows are po-
tentially important for natural resource exploitation. Multinational …rms, for exam-
ple, …nance their own activities, and are in charge of the exploitation of oil …elds
in many countries. This is, nevertheless, consistent with our closed-economy model
because it treats income from natural riches as exogenous, as in for instance Caselli
and Cunningham (2009).
Second, we abstract from the existence of a central government. As long as re-
source abundant regions bene…t more from their natural resources compared to the
resource poor ones, our results would go through. This has the underlying implica-
tion that resource abundant regions have some …scal advantage due to the resources
located in their territories, irrespective of any existing equalization payment schemes.
This may happen directly due to the control of the tax base, or indirectly through
revenue sharing and grants from the central government. In the former case, decen-
tralization directly provides the regions some …scal ownership over its resources; ex-
amples include Argentina, Canada, the United Arab Emirates and the United States,
where subnational ownership over resources is constitutionally entrenched. Under
revenue sharing and grants arrangements, on the other hand, the central government
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owns the natural riches, yet it may redistribute greater proportions of the revenues to
natural-resource rich areas; examples now include Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Nigeria and Russia (see Brosio and Jimenez 2012 for Latin America; and
Ahmad and Mottu 2002 for nations worldwide). In addition, notice that even in the
most equalized federations some signi…cant …scal imbalance remains regardless of the
equalization schemes (see Boadway 2006 for the case of Canada).
Third, as Oates (1993), Prud’homme (1995) and Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2005),
among others, argue, di¤erences in the capacity to generate public goods can be a
consequence of economies of scale in production, administration or even negotiation,
so that a central government or bigger/richer regions might be more e¢cient at the
provision of public goods. Inman and Rubinfeld (2000), and Storper (2005) also
emphasize that local governments may fall more easily prey of elites or special-interest
groups, and su¤er from greater corruption.
Finally, the …xed-population assumption is made for simplicity. What is essen-
tially required for the model results to hold is that labor is su¢ciently less mobile
than capital; speci…cally, when moving towards less agglomerated areas where natural
resources are located. We further discuss and present supporting evidence for these
latter claims regarding the lack of factor co-movement and systematic di¤erences in
agglomeration levels in Appendices A and B.3
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital that
are inelastically supplied to the production sector. As return from the use of these
inputs, the consumer obtains a wage payment () and an interest rate () that are
allocated to the consumption of a private good () and to pay taxes levied on capital
at rate  . A representative individual derives utility () from the consumption of
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this private good and from a public good  supplied by the government:
 = ln() + ln() (1)
where
 =  +  ¡   (2)
Governments
Regional governments are rent-seekers and …scally autonomous. Region ’s authorities
tax capital () and use the region’s natural input endowment () to obtain rents
() and …nance the public good. The emphasis on capital taxation is made because
of its relative importance in …scally decentralized scenarios (see Newman and Sullivan
1988, and Wilson and Wildasin 2004), and is more speci…cally motivated by our focus
on capital mobility.
The problem reduces to choosing  ,  and  to maximize their current utility
() that depends on the rents and the representative consumer’s utility. For ease of
exposition, policymakers take as given all variables that are not directly under their
control. More speci…cally, the government in region  solves:
max
f g
f =  ln + (1¡ )g   2 [0 1] (3)
subject to
 +   =  + (4)
 given by (1),
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     taken as given.
The weighting coe¢cient  can be interpreted as a region-speci…c rent-seeking
parameter; we also use it to capture possible heterogeneity in the capacity of regions
to provide the public good . A higher value of  implies that the government is
more interested in its own consumption, either because of corruption or because of an
inability to provide better public services. Expression (4) is a feasibility constraint
that equates public revenues to public expenditures.
The …rst order conditions to this problem imply the following optimal choices:
  =
1
2¡ 
·
 +  ¡ (1¡ )


¸
 (5)
and
 = (1¡ ) ( +  )  (6)
The tax rate then falls with the natural endowment, and increases with income and
. Government spending , on the other hand, rises with tax revenues and natural
resources, and falls with the intensity of the rent-seeking behavior of politicians .
Another interesting implication of expression (5) is that for a su¢ciently large value of
the natural endowment, the region can fully …nance public goods using natural riches,
and then the optimal tax rate becomes a subsidy to private-goods consumption.
Production and equilibrium outcomes
Expressions (5) and (6) determine the control variables as implicit functions, because
 depends on equilibrium prices and taxes. In order to know how tax rates and
government spending reacts to changes in exogenous variables and parameters, we
need to specify the production side of the model. We assume that there exist a
large number of pro…t-maximizing …rms of mass one that produce in region ’s non-
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resource-extractive sector using labor and capital as inputs according to
 = 

 
1¡
 ; (7)
where  2 (0 1); and  is the region-speci…c technology level which we discuss later.
Unlike labor, capital moves perfectly across regions until the rental price net of
taxes () is equalized and the capital market clears. Market clearing requires that
X
=1
 =  ; (8)
where  is the nation’s capital stock, taken as given.
To see how the region’s capital stock reacts to changes in exogenous variables
and parameters, we compute the tax rate,  , and the net return to capital, .
Assuming that …rms take prices as given, the …rst order conditions to the …rms’
pro…t maximization problem deliver
  =

2¡ 
µ


¶µ
1¡ + 


¶
¡
µ
1¡ 
2¡ 
¶


(9)
and
 =

2¡ 
µ


¶ ·
(1¡ )


¡ (1¡ )
¸
+
µ
1¡ 
2¡ 
¶


 (10)
The last two equalities imply that, other things constant, both   and  rise with
. The impact of , on the other hand, is positive on   but negative on . In
addition, the RHS of expression (10) declines with . Hence, because net returns
are equalized across areas, a region with a higher  or a lower  will attract less
capital – the former e¤ect is due to the larger tax rate charged, and the latter one to
the smaller input productivity.
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To see how the provision of public goods is a¤ected, combine (6), (7), and the fact
that inputs are paid their marginal productivity to get:
 =
1¡ 
2¡ 
½

µ


¶
[(1¡ ) + ] + 
¾
 (11)
Government spending then falls with the intensity of politicians’ rent-seeking, and
increases with the productivity parameter – notice that this remains true even when
taking into account equilibrium e¤ects on capital.
Fiscal decentralization and the natural resource curse
A natural resource curse occurs if a resource windfall in one of the regions induces an
economy-wide decrease in the output produced by the non-resource sector that more
than o¤sets the gains that the newly discovered natural riches bring to the nation.
In our model, this means that


X
=1
( + )  0 (12)
Looking at expression (7) that gives non-resource sector output , the curse in our
model can be seen as a consequence of a su¢ciently large decrease in the weighted
average of  across regions.
Let us consider that
 = 

 

 ; (13)
where ,  are strictly positive. The e¤ect of the output level  on the region-speci…c
productivity captures agglomeration externalities of the type emphasized by Ciccone
and Hall (1996). The e¤ect of , in turn, re‡ects the contribution of public goods as
inputs, either directly as infrastructure, or indirectly through their role, for example,
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in the human capital accumulation process. Both of these e¤ects in expression (13)
are potentially important for our analysis: natural resources are located in relatively
low agglomerated areas (see online appendix A for evidence), and the impact of …scal
decentralization on growth is related to the capacity of regions to provide public
goods.
Coming back to the question of when inequality (12) may hold, a region that
enjoys a resource windfall will in principle tend to have a larger  – by (11) – and
therefore a larger . However, there are at least two channels in the model that
can contribute to diminish  and deliver the negative sign in (12): one related to
politics, and the other to the reallocation of capital among regions.
The political channel is related to forces that directly generate a lower provision
of public goods. This could be the case if
 = () (14)
and   0; put di¤erently, if a resource windfall intensi…es the rent-seeking
behavior of politicians. By expression (11), a higher rent-seeking parameter implies
a lower , leading to lower productivity () and output levels. If the reduction is
su¢cient, it will produce a natural resource curse.
This e¤ect can be present, to some extent, regardless of the degree of …scal de-
centralization. However, as discussed earlier a higher degree of …scal independence
contributes to making the curse more pronounced if local governments, speci…cally in
poorer and less agglomerated regions, fall more easily prey of elites, special-interest
groups, and corruption. Indeed, supporting empirical evidence are obtained by Brollo
et al. (2013) and Caselli and Michaels (2013) who …nd that in Brazil, a …scally decen-
tralized nation, municipalities that enjoy resource windfalls become more corrupted,
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and do not increase the supply of public goods.
The second channel is a market mechanism. Expression (13) implies that mul-
tifactor productivity is a function of the regional level of economic activity and the
supply of public goods. Therefore, the reallocation of capital towards geographical
areas with weaker agglomeration externalities and, as a consequence, less government
spending will contribute to generate the curse. This originates directly from …scal
decentralization. In particular, it is a consequence of the lower tax rate chosen by
regions that enjoy the resource windfall, as seen through condition (9).
In this respect, it is important to mention that there is evidence that supports that
better-endowed areas compete more aggressively and drain capital from their poorly
endowed counterparts. For example, Cai and Treisman (2005) provides evidence for
post-communist Russia, Raveh (2013) for U.S. states, and Yao and Zhang (2008) for
a less developed nation like China. For general discussions on the importance, and
occurence, of competition for production factors in …scally decentralized nations see,
for example, Qian and Roland (1998) and Li et al. (2000).
Another factor that can contribute to the negative e¤ect is the input misallocation
generated by the constant population assumption, which increases the disparity in
capital-labor ratios across regions. In online appendix B, we carry out a calibration
exercise that shows that the market mechanism is quantitatively able to cause the
curse.
Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical support for the main hypothesis of the article; namely,
that …scally decentralized economies are more vulnerable to the growth curse of nat-
ural resources. It also tests the ampli…cation mechanisms to which the theory has
pointed out. Given that the fundamental …ndings on the curse are rooted in the sem-
12
inal work of Sachs and Warner (1997), subsection tests our hypothesis using their
database and cross-sectional methodology. Later, subsection departs from Sachs and
Warner and undertakes panel estimations using an extended sample of countries and
years covered. Finally, in subsection , we undertake various robustness checks.
A detailed description of all variables, their de…nitions, and sources, are given
in online appendix C. Online appendix D provides the nations included in each of
the samples. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the
article.
Cross-section tests
We …rst employ Sachs and Warner’s (1997) data, variables, and cross-sectional esti-
mation methodology. Because of limitations in the …scal decentralization data, the
original sample reduces to a cross-section of 51 countries that covers the period of
1970-1990. Employing those numbers, we test the following model:
^ = 0 + 1 + ; (15)
where  represents the country; ^ is average annual growth in real per capita GDP
during the interval 1970-1990;  is a vector of controls that includes resource share,
initial income, openness, investment, institutional quality, ethnicity, terms of trade,
education, …scal decentralization, interactions terms of the natural resource share
with ethnicity, institutional quality, and …scal decentralization, and a dummy for
landlocked economies;  is the disturbance. Our focus will be on the latter interaction
term, which puts our hypothesis to test.
In their analysis, Sachs and Warner (1997) measured resource abundance as the
GDP share of mineral output in 1970. One key concern in the resource curse literature
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is the potential endogeneity of this measure (van der Ploeg 2011). Therefore, in the
benchmark cross-sectional framework, we follow Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008)
and Arezki and van der Ploeg (2011), and use the World Bank’s (2006) measure of
natural capital: the total stock of sub-soil assets, timber, non-timber forest resources,
protected areas, cropland, and pastureland. This stock variable is arguably more
exogenous to growth than Sachs and Warner’s ‡ow variables, because it captures an
economy’s amount of proven natural reserves rather than its capacity to produce or
export them. Hence, in the analysis to follow to we use the GDP share of natural
capital in 2000 as the resource share proxy.4
As for the …scal decentralization measure, we follow Davoodi and Zou (1998),
Oates (1985, 1993) and Zhang and Zou (1998), and employ the World Bank’s Fiscal
Decentralization Indicators, which are based on data from the International Monetary
Fund’s Government Finance Statistics.5 Since the World Bank provides several of
those measures, we use the one that most closely resembles the model’s notion of …scal
decentralization, which is the degree to which sub-national governments fund their
expenditures through their own revenue sources (Vertical Imbalance). The higher
the indicator, the more independent sub-national governments are, implying that the
country as a whole is more …scally decentralized.6
Results appear in table 2. Regression 1 replicates Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s
(2008) analysis with the addition of Mehlum et al.’s (2006) interaction term of insti-
tutional quality and resources, Hodler’s (2004) interaction term of fractionalization
and resources, and our proposed interaction term of …scal decentralization and the
resource share proxy (along with the …scal decentralization variable). Results on the
various controls replicate those presented in previous studies in terms of signs and
occasionally signi…cance, including those on the non-…scal-decentralization interac-
tion terms, which replicate Hodler’s (2004) and Mehlum et al.’s (2006). Regression
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1 con…rms our main hypothesis: the estimated coe¢cient on the interaction of …s-
cal decentralization and resources is negative and signi…cant, con…rming our main
hypothesis by showing that the negative growth e¤ect of resources is transmitted
through the decentralization channel.7
Given that the natural capital measure is an aggregation of various types of natural
resources, we disaggregate it to its various components (namely, cropland, forest,
pastureland, protected areas, subsoil assets) to better understand the source of this.
Results appear in Regressions 2 to 6 in table 2, where we use the GDP share of
each component. In these cases interactions of the resource proxy with ethnicity and
institutional quality are excluded to minimize multicollinearity. The main result holds
only under the subsoil assets, being the triggering group for the overall average e¤ect.
Indeed, this is consistent with the focus minerals have taken in previous studies on
the natural resource curse (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1997, Ross 2001).
To further strengthen our claim let us try to o¤er additional evidence in favor of
the mechanisms that drive the model prediction that …scally decentralized nations
may not bene…t from resource windfalls: inter-regional di¤erences in agglomeration
levels. In particular, smaller isolated areas can be less e¢cient in the production and
provision of public goods, and subject to stronger corruption problems. This is the
main source in the model of the negative e¤ects induced by a resource windfall.
More speci…cally, we construct an agglomeration index based only on population
density vis-a-vis urbanization levels. This measure divides each country’s total non-
urbanized area by its total area (both in square kilometers); where the calculation
of non-urbanized areas follows the de…nition of non-urbanization provided by the
United Nations, on per-country basis.8 A higher value is interpreted as an indica-
tion of greater agglomeration di¤erences. Importantly, the sample shows virtually
zero correlation between this agglomeration measure and economic growth, which
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mitigates endogeneity related concerns.
The model prediction is that decentralized economies with a higher index are more
vulnerable to the growth curse. We multiply the …scal decentralization measure and
the above index, and refer to the updated index as potential vulnerability. Results
appear in Regression 9, and con…rm those presented in Regression 1. This provides
some validation to the underlying forces, implying that resource endowments may be
hurting …scally decentralized economies through the proposed channels.
Fiscal decentralization can also su¤er from endogeneity problems. Previous stud-
ies show that …scal decentralization has several determinants, the key ones being land
area, level of democracy, and level of income, each a¤ecting …scal decentralization
positively – see Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), Oates (1972), Panizza (1999), and
Treisman (2006). Thus …scal decentralization may in fact be endogenous to growth
through an unobserved development factor; consequently, the positive association
between income and …scal decentralization could be creating an upward bias. We
address this concern by taking an IV approach. In particular, we use the abovemen-
tioned determinant, land area, as instrument for …scal decentralization. Consistent
with the …ndings of previous studies, the logarithm of land area is positively corre-
lated with our measure of …scal decentralization ( = 051), as depicted in …gure 1.
As for the exclusion restriction, some authors such as Alesina et al. (2005) discuss
the potential endogenous nature of a country’s land area and its in‡uence on eco-
nomic growth. Their work suggests that controlling for the degree of openness can
minimize this in‡uence; this is what we do. Our identi…cation assumption is that,
once controlling for the level of openness, land area a¤ects growth solely through the
…scal decentralization channel.9
We follow Wooldridge’s (2002) approach to instrumentation of endogenous inter-
action terms. In the …rst stage, we predict …scal decentralization using the instrument
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and the exogenous explanatory variables of the regression. We then interact the pre-
dicted variable with the natural resource share proxy and use it in the second stage
of the TSLS estimation. Results appear in Regressions 7 and 10. First stage results
con…rm the validity of the instrument, through the  -statistic and the coe¢cient of
interest (being positive and signi…cant). Second stage estimations, in turn, show that
the key result remains: the coe¢cient on the interaction term of decentralization and
resources is negative and signi…cant in all cases.
Panel data analyses
The previous cross-sectional analyses, a-la Sachs and Warner, raise several concerns.
First, the time period covered is limited (1970-1990). Second, the sample covers
merely 51 countries. Last, the cross-sectional estimation methodology potentially
gives rise to both omitted variable and endogeneity biases (van der Ploeg 2011).
Departing from Sachs and Warner, we now employ an extended panel that covers
the period 1972-2008 (in 9-year intervals) for 73 countries; the maximum number
provided by the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization Indicators.10 The use of this
panel allows addressing the above concerns.
We estimate the following model:
^ = 0 + 1 +  +  (16)
The variables ^,  and  are the same ones as in speci…cation (15), for country
 at date , with the di¤erence of excluding ethnicity and terms of trade as controls
due to lack of data, as well as some additional measurement di¤erences outlined
below. Because the Hausman test strongly rejects (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis
of an e¢cient random e¤ects model, we take a …xed e¤ects approach and include
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, denoting country …xed e¤ects. This approach also mitigates potential omitted
variable bias, alleviates concerns regarding potential multicollinearity by centering
variables, and helps control for unobserved within-country constant phenomena, being
a standard concern under the given framework. All variables are measured in the
initial year of the corresponding time interval to reduce endogeneity concerns,11 and
are expressed in deviations from period means so that time …xed e¤ects are also
implicitly controlled for in all the corresponding regressions (e.g., see Caselli et al.
1996).
Not all the explanatory variables employed in these panel estimations are measured
in the same way as in the cross-sectional analysis due to data limitations, though all
our measures are standard in the economic growth literature (see online appendix B).
Speci…cally, given its greater coverage, institutional quality is now measured by the
Civil Liberties Index, which is commonly used as a proxy for institutional quality.
Civil liberties, however, do not capture corruption levels that are essential for our
analysis. Therefore, as a separate control, we follow Andersen and Aslaksen (2008)
and consider the level of democracy as a proxy for corruption, using data from the
Polity-IV project dataset.12 We include as well its interaction with the resource proxy
to control for the heterogeneous e¤ects across levels of corruption (but excluding the
interaction with institutional quality, due to multicollinearity).
As for resource abundance, we also use a di¤erent measure, in an attempt to cap-
ture exogenous variations in resource shocks over time. This measure is constructed
as follows: for each country, we take the GDP share of mineral rents in the earliest
year available, and multiply it by the average international price index of mineral
goods (normalized to 2005) at time .13 Put di¤erently, we keep the initial share of
mineral production in GDP constant, but we weigh the share at each point in time
with the corresponding level of mineral prices.
18
As presented in …gure 2, the relative international ranking in the GDP share
of mineral output (having nations with no mineral output assigned a rank of 1)
has changed little over time: countries that were largely mineral abundant at the
beginning of the period (1972) appear to hold their relative ranking 36 years later
( = 081). Keeping the share of mineral production in GDP constant, hence, can
still capture accurately the countries’ relative position with respect to their mineral
abundance over time. To the extent that changes in international mineral prices
are exogenously driven and that initial mineral output is pre-determined, we argue
that the variation we investigate is indeed exogenous since it is entirely triggered by
changes in the international price of minerals.
Results appear in Regression 1 of table 3. Results on convergence, openness,
investment, institutional quality, democracy, education, decentralization and the in-
teraction of resources with institutional quality are similar in sign, and occasionally
in signi…cance, to previous …ndings in the cross-section tests. Interestingly, the re-
gression shows that our main result – a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient on the
interaction term between …scal decentralization and resource share – holds in this
case as well.
There is a debate in the literature on the nature of the link between …scal de-
centralization and internal con‡icts (Siegle and O’Mahony 2006). To the extent that
…scal decentralization may induce internal con‡icts, the observed e¤ect on growth may
be driven through that channel. We test this hypothesis by adding an indicator for
whether an internal armed con‡ict has taken place in the investigated time interval;
this measure is retrieved from the Uppsala Con‡ict Data Program.14 This exercise is
undertaken in Regression 2 which shows that our main result on the interaction term
of interest remains.
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Additional robustness checks
Regressions 3 to 5 in table 3 contain further robustness tests of our main hypothe-
sis. Using the panel data, we begin by considering an output-based resource measure,
which allows us to examine variations in resource discoveries and technology improve-
ments (on top of price variations, as was done initially): the GDP share of primary
rents. Regression 4 reproduces Regression 1 using this output-based measure. Results
on all variables, including our interaction term, are similar in sign and signi…cance.
Nevertheless, as was mentioned previously, this measure is potentially endogenous
(motivating our use of the price-based measure in the baseline speci…cation); thus,
we take an IV approach and instrument it with the GDP share of mineral rents in
¡ 1. We view this measure as a suitable IV, because it is highly correlated with our
proxy ( = 09), and relatively exogenous to growth. Its exogeneity can be justi…ed as
follows: …rst, mineral rents are not dependent on an economy’s capability to export,
thus making it less correlated with development and growth; second, mineral rents in
developing economies are usually extracted by multi-national …rms that bring their
own technology and production factors, making these rents relatively independent of
unobserved development indicators; last, the lagged value is arguably more exogenous
to growth in the following period. Estimation of the endogenous interaction term
is carried out using the previously described procedure. Results are reported in
Regression 5 of table 3. First stage results validate the instrument, and the second
stage ones con…rm our main result.
Let us now test the hypothesis using a di¤erent …scal decentralization measure,
and in particular, the Kearney Decentralization Index (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005).
Although there are several available decentralization indices, we adopt this one be-
cause of its larger time and country coverage: the index is available for 43 devel-
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oping and developed countries over the years 1965-1995. The Kearney measure is a
comprehensive index that covers nine distinct dimensions of …scal decentralization.
We adopt one of them: the Revenue Raising Authority dimension; it measures sub-
national governments’ formal authority to raise their own revenue through taxation,
which resembles the model’s notion of decentralization more closely.15 Regression 3 of
table 3 replicates Regression 1 using the Kearney measure, the previously described
price-based resource measure, and a panel that covers the period of 1965-2000 with
5-year intervals.16 Results under these measure are similar to previous estimations;
our main result, therefore, is robust to di¤erent decentralization variables.
We realize that throughout the panel analyses the …scal decentralization measure
remains potentially endogenous. Adopting a suitable IV with su¢cient time variation
is not straightforward. As an alternative, we turn to test the cross-sectional version
of our panel employing the logarithm of land area as an instrument for …scal de-
centralization. More speci…cally, we extend the previously used Sachs and Warner’s
cross-sectional sample to 2008, use the logarithm of land area as IV for …scal de-
centralization, and employ the previously discussed natural capital measure as the
resource share proxy. Regression 8 of table 2 gives the outcome of this exercise for the
period 1970-2008. Our main …nding is once again con…rmed. Although not presented,
similar results arise when the time interval from 1990 to 2008 is used instead.
To this point we considered maximized cross-country samples that include both
developed and developing economies. Often times, however, the natural resource
curse hypothesis refers speci…cally to developing economies (Auty 1993). Let us test,
therefore, whether our result holds for developing economies. Hence, we divide our
samples into high and non-high income economies based on the earliest available
classi…cation provided by the World Bank starting at 1989, and estimate the basic
speci…cations as in Regression 1 of table 2 and Regressions 1 and 3 of table 3, for each
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group separately.17 Due to multicollinearity concerns when the sample is split, we
exclude the interaction terms of the resource share measure with fractionalization and
rule of law in the cross-sectional case, and the measure of democracy together with its
interaction with the price-based resource measure in the panel cases. Results appear
in table 4. As can be seen, the main result is strongly apparent in the developing
economies group, and weakly so in the developed one. This result also lends support to
the political angle of the model, and its potential signi…cance in the overall mechanism,
given that corruption levels are higher and markets more imperfect in developing
economies.
Given our empirical setting, using various standard country-level controls and
interaction terms, one concern is that our main results may be plagued by multi-
collinearity. In the panel analyses this is addressed through the usage of a …xed
e¤ects framework that centers the variables. However, to address this further we es-
timate the benchmark regressions, namely Regression 1 of table 2, and Regressions 1,
3 and 4 of table 3, with the non-…scal-decentralization related interactions excluded.
Results appear in table A2 in the online appendix. The highest Variance In‡ation
Factor (uncentered) in all cases is 6.58, indicating multicollinearity levels are su¢-
ciently low. In all regressions the main result remains to hold in sign, signi…cance,
and magnitude, hence alleviating related concerns.
Conclusion
The question of why resource endowments lead to divergent outcomes continues to
attract much interest among economists. This article presented a novel answer to that
question: countries with a high degree of …scal decentralization are more vulnerable to
the negative e¤ects of natural resource windfalls. The new hypothesis also contributes
to understanding the e¤ects of …scal decentralization on economic growth.
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We explored a model that suggests possible channels through which …scal decen-
tralization and natural resource booms can interact to increase the probability of a
natural resource curse. To support the theory, we have shown that natural resources
are located in less agglomerated, sparsely-populated regions; areas in which we have
argued that agglomeration externalities are weaker, and the growth-harming e¤ects
emphasized by the …scal decentralization literature are more likely to arise. If this
is the case, resource windfalls may incentivize rent-seeking behavior of local, …scally-
autonomous, governments – the political channel. In addition, natural riches can lead
less agglomerated and e¢cient regions to cut taxes and attract capital from more pro-
ductive areas – the market mechanism. These two channels can contribute to drop
total output in the nation, following a natural resource boom.
The main hypothesis – that countries with a high degree of …scal decentraliza-
tion are more vulnerable to the natural resource curse – has been empirically tested
and con…rmed. First, we used the original Sachs and Warner’s (1997) data set and
method; then, an extended panel, in conjunction with the World Bank’s Fiscal De-
centralization Indicators. Finally, we have shown that results are robust to di¤erent
resource abundance and …scal decentralization measures, as well as to di¤erent esti-
mation techniques and time periods.
The article has, in general, remained agnostic about the contribution of each of
the two mechanisms to our estimations – whether one is more important than the
other. Yet results have shown that the interaction between …scal decentralization and
natural resources is driven mainly by developing nations. This suggests that political
channels might be more signi…cant than market mechanisms. Nevertheless, assessing
more accurately the relative importance of each of them represents a promising avenue
for future research. In addition, results may be sensitive to the speci…c periods and
countries investigated. Future work should further test the results and analyze the
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suggested mechanisms using di¤erent data sets and case studies, as they become
available
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Notes
1This does not mean that …scal decentralization increases corruption nation-wide.
What it implies is that corruption rises in …scally autonomous regions where resource
booms occur. We later reference papers that support this role.
2The concept of agglomeration economies refers to the positive externalities of
economic integration at the local level, especially with respect to increased labor
market pooling, shared inputs, and knowledge spillovers.
3Implicit in this is the assumption that capital is relatively highly mobile across
regions within the same nation. Previous studies support this notion.
4Year 2000 is preferred because it gives the largest sample size, 51 countries.
Results do not change qualitatively in case the numbers provided by the World Bank
for 1995 and 2005 are employed instead. Results do not change either if we use Sachs
and Warner’s measure – the mineral output GDP share in 1970; estimates using this
last proxy are provided in table A1 in the online appendix.
5In terms of coverage, indicators are only provided for countries that report ex-
penditures at both the national and sub-national levels. Nonetheless, as reported by
the World Bank, this coverage re‡ects a lack of reported data rather than few coun-
tries with local and provincial governments; also, this should not necessarily re‡ect
di¤erences in the degree of …scal decentralization between countries included in the
sample and those that are not – the sample ranges from highly decentralized countries
to highly centralized ones.
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6Given that the seminal Sachs and Warner’s analysis starts at 1970, the …scal
decentralization measure collected for each country is the one closest to 1970, up to
1975 (to mitigate endogeneity concerns), so that countries that do not have such a
measure available up to 1975 are not included in the sample. This limits the coverage
of our cross-sectional sample to 51 countries.
7For all cases reported in tables we have also estimated the regressions without
incorporating any of the …scal decentralization related variables, and with …scal de-
centralization but without its interaction term. Results were similar for all variables.
8For detailed de…nitions see the Gridded Population of the World database of the
Center for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University.
9Regardless of any arguments over exogeneity, there were very little changes in
the land area of the countries in our sample throughout the investigated period. In
fact, the only countries in our sample that experienced such a change are Denmark,
Philippines, and Spain, with the largest change being at a rate of only 0.07 percent
over the period.
10This is an unbalanced panel, limited by data availability of the World Bank’s
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators. We use 9-year intervals to maximize sample size,
while maintaining a relatively long time interval, consistent with the resource curse
hypothesis; longer time intervals decrease sample size signi…cantly.
11Nonetheless, we note that results are not sensitive to the alternative usage of
average values.
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12Note that the correlation between our proxies for corruption and institutional
quality stands at approximately 0.5, a¢rming to some extent their distinct de…ni-
tions, and motivating their concurrent inclusion in the regressions. Nonetheless, we
note that all results hold if only one of them is included. In addition, we discuss
multicollinearity related concerns separately in a later section.
13Data retrieved from the World Bank. Mineral resources include: oil, natural gas,
minerals, and coal. Rents are computed as unit rents times production, where a unit
rent is the unit price less unit cost. The price measure is a general index that does not
account for the di¤erent mineral shares of each country; prices of di¤erent minerals,
however, exhibit strong co-movement.
14An internal armed con‡ict is de…ned as a contested incompatibility that concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related
deaths. The internal armed con‡ict occurs between the government of a state and
one or more internal opposition group(s), without intervention from other states.
15This component of the index assigns each country a number between zero and
four, with four having the highest level of revenue raising autonomy and zero the
least.
16We adopt 5-year intervals in this case, again, to maximize the sample size (notice
that the index is available in 5-year intervals as well). Nonetheless, results do not
change qualitatively if 10-year intervals are adopted instead.
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17See online appendix D for a list of economies included in each group. We note
that results hold as well if the developed-economies group includes also the middle-
income countries, leaving the developing-economies group with the low-income ones
only.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Growth, 1970-1990 1.3 1.6 -3.09 5.7 Ethnicity 36.89 28.35 0 89
Growth, 1970-2008 3.4 3.1 -1.2 17.77 Terms of trade -0.41 2.32 -4.69 7.38
GDP share of mineral 
output 
0.04 0.08 0 0.37 Education 0.17 0.14 0.005 0.54
GDP share of natural 
capital 
0.02 0.05 0.0001 0.38 Landlocked economies 0.13 0.34 0 1
Logarithm of initial 
income 
8.65 0.86 6.76 9.95 Vertical Imbalance 67.15 23.94 7.02 99.8
Openness 0.5 0.45 0 1 Potential Vulnerability 62.47 24.75 3.96 99
GDP share of cropland 0.02 0.02 0.0001 0.104 GDP share of pastureland 0.006 0.008 0.0002 0.04
GDP share of forest 0.006 0.01 1E-05 0.06
GDP share of protected 
areas
0.006 0.01 3E-05 0.09
Investment 2.86 0.49 1.33 3.61
Modified Potential 
Vulnerability 
9.63 4.31 0.97 20.6
Institutional quality 3.56 2.005 1 6 Logarithm of land area 12.65 1.97 6.54 16
GDP share of subsoil 
assets
0.005 0.01 0 0.05
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Growth, 1972-2008 2.13 2.75 -8.06 12.98 Growth, 1965-2000 2.14 2.98 -11.39 22.4
Price-based resource 
measure 
1.81 8.48 0 120.4
Price-based resource 
measure 
4.42 7.61 0 61.7
GDP share of primary 
rents 
0.05 0.09 0 0.78 Logarithm of initial income 7.49 1.57 4.43 10.5
GDP share of mineral 
rents 
0.03 0.08 0 0.78 Openness 0.39 0.24 0.05 1.92
Logarithm of initial 
income 
8.75 1.25 4.91 11.4 Investment 24.75 8.81 1.34 58.3
Openness 0.71 0.42 0.02 3.24 Institutional quality 4.31 2.19 1 7
Investment 24.4 9.23 5.17 70.31 Education 5.45 2.95 0.13 12.7
Institutional quality 4.86 1.83 1 7
Kearney Decentralization 
Index 
1.18 1.06 0 3.56
Education 7.17 2.82 0.57 12.7 Democracy 4.66 4.19 0 10
Democracy 5.93 4.11 0 10
Vertical Imbalance 45.72 21.25 0.91 97.38
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Note: Further descriptions and sources of all variables are outlined in the Appendix.
A. Cross-sectional analysis
B. Panel analysis
Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5; Table 3 Regression 3; Table 3
Panel A: Main and second stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (TSLS)
(TSLS, 
extending 
to 2008)
(OLS) (TSLS)
Natural capital 10.72 17.27 6.23 7 .67 14.34
(27.01) (27.47) (54.59) (27.29) (27.56)
Cropland  -6.68
(22.01)
Forest -30.37
 (46.53)
Pastureland -150.36
(132.22)
Protected areas -1.5
(52.78)
Subsoil assets 37.54
(30.89)
Logarithm of initial income -2.02*** -2.15*** -2.04*** -1.89*** -2.02*** -1.54*** -1.94*** -2.22*** -1.99*** -1.94***
(0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.36) (0.34) (0.45) (0.37) (0.34)
Openness 2.81*** 2.12*** 2.32*** 2.22*** 2.27*** 1.99*** 2.75*** 5.09*** 2.81*** 2.75***
(0.49) (0.49) (0.41) (0.53) (0.48) (0.51) (0.49) (1.45) (0.49) (0.49)
Investment 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.24 1.05* -0.26 1.16 -0.05 -0.22
(0.45) (0.48) (0.49) (0.56) (0.55) (0.53) (0.39) (0.85) (0.42) (0.39)
Rule of law 0.04 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.05 -0.43 0.05 0.05
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19) (0.44) (0.2) (0.19)
Ethnicity -0.01 -0.009 -0.007 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) (0.007) (0.03) (0.007) (0.007)
Terms of trade 0.16** 0.13* 0.13 0.13 0.18** 0.31*** 0.16** 0.05 0.16** 0.16**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07)
Education 2.85** 2.06* 2.22* 2.54* 2.68** 1.99* 2.68** 4.43* 2.72** 2.69**
(1.29) (1.19) (1.25) (1.36) (1.28) (1.13) (1.28) (2.49) (1.23) (1.28)
Landlocked economies 0.22 -0.63 -0.29 -0.99** -0.99* -1.11** 0.41 0.19 0.28 0.39
(0.45) (0.59) (0.38) (0.49) (0.54) (0.43) (0.51) (0.91) (0.45) (0.49)
Ethnicity x Resource share -0.62** -0.71** -1.06 -0.61** -0.66**
(0.27) (0.26) (0.68) (0.27) (0.29)
Rule of law x Resource share 7.84** 8.14** 18.32** 7.97** 7.89**
(3.67) (3.77) (7.2) (3.74) (3.81)
Fiscal decentralization 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal decentralization x Resource type 
share
-0.39*** -0.34 -0.31 1.77 -0.25 -1.19*** -0.46*** -0.71** -0.37*** -0.43***
(0.08) (0.33) (0.53) (1.37) (0.6) (0.38) (0.1) (0.27) (0.09) (0.09)
Adjusted R-squared 0.7853 0.7238 0.7513 0.6956 0.708 0.7532 0.7733 0.6517 0.7827 0.7695
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Regressions:
Dependent variable:
Logarithm of land area
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Table 2. Cross-Country Growth Regressions, Cross-Section [Sachs and Warner (1997) database, period: 1970-1990, unless specified otherwise]
(0.91)
0.8146
21.16
Panel B: First stage results
Dependent variable: Average annual 
growthin real per capita GDP, 1970-1990
Fiscal decentralization 
is 'Potential 
Vulnerability'
(7), (8) (10)
Fiscal decentralization is 'Vertical Imbalance'
Note: Standard errors are robust and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *,**, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. First stage regressions include all relevant variables. All regressions include an intercept.  ‘Resource type’ refers to the specific type of 
natural resource examined in the regression. All resource-type variables are measured as GDP shares (source: World Bank 2006). For description and sources 
of variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see Appendix.
Fiscal decentralization
3.59***
(0.99)
0.7823
17.2
Fiscal 
decentralization
4.93***
Panel A: Main and second stage 
results
(1) (2)
(3)
Kearney
(4)
(5)
[TSLS]
Resource share  0.47 0.46 0.003  10.41 6.78
(0.44) (0.43) (0.05) (8.3) (10.44)
Logarithm of initial income -3.46*** -3.48*** -2.2* -4.18*** -4.36***
(1.23) (1.23) (1.2) (1.24) (1.28)
Openness 1.26 1.22 1.1 1.14 1.19
(1.26) (1.34) (1.94) (1.13) (1.22)
Investment 0.38 0.39 2.32*** 0.71 0.81
1.2 (1.19) (0.62) (1.09) (1.16)
Civil liberties -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.22 -0.63*** -0.56***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Democracy -0.12 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.21
(0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Democracy x Resource share -0.09 -0.09 -0.004 1.64 -0.59
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (1.24) (0.89)
Education 0.39 0.34 0.85*** 0.34 0.24
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)
Fiscal decentralization -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal decentralization x 
Resource share
-0.01*** -0.01** -0.05** -0.4** -0.4**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.02) (0.19) (0.19)
Internal armed conflicts -0.11
(0.62)
Adjusted R-squared 0.8034  0.8035 0.5859 0.7982 0.7987
Observations 207 207 232 207 207
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of economies included 73 73 43 73 73
Panel B: First stage results
Regressions:
Dependent variable:
GDP share of mineral rents in t-1
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Dependent variable: Average 
annual growthin real per capita 
GDP for sample period
Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by country, and appear in parentheses for 
independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. In Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5 the period covered is 1972-2008 in 
9-year intervals, with the fiscal decentralization measure being ‘Vertical Imbalance’; In 
Regression 3 the period covered is 1965-2000, in 5-year intervals, with the fiscal 
decentralization measure being the Revenue Raising Authority component of the 
Kearney Decentralization Index. First stage regressions include all relevant variables. All 
regressions include an intercept. All variables are expressed as deviations from period 
means so that time fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. For description and 
sources of variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see 
Appendix.
Table 3. Cross-Country Growth Regressions, Panel Data (OLS estimations, unless 
specified otherwise]
71.04
(5)
GDP share of primary 
rents
0.99***
(0.06)
0.8877
Using the price-based measure 
as the
resource share proxy
Using GDP share of 
primary rents as 
the
Cross section 
(Table 2, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 3)
Cross section 
(Table 2, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource share 11.82** 0.54 -0.03 -9.77 0.26 0.21**
(4.24) (0.74) (0.05) (107.337) (0.32) (0.08)
Logarithm of initial income -2.48***  -2.95*** -1.94 -1.05* -4.11*** -4.68***
(0.33) (1.39) (1.22) (0.57) (1.16) (1.31)
Openness 3.43*** 0.001 1.21 2.21 3.88*** 3.14
(0.71) (1.33) (2.64) (1.72) (1.22) (1.87)
Investment -0.02 1.16 2.23*** 0.63 -1.72 -0.59
(0.67) (1.56) (0.62) (0.69) (1.29) (1.37)
Rule of law 0.25 -0.28
(0.25) (0.28)
Ethnicity -0.03*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Terms of trade 0.16** 0.91
(0.07) (0.35)
Landlocked economies -0.49 -0.46
(0.89) (0.35)
Education -0.19 0.79* 1.14*** 2.51* -0.21 0.31
(2.66) (0.42) (0.29) (1.23) (0.24) (0.52)
Civil liberties -0.69** -0.14 -0.23 -0.43**
(0.29) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14)
Fiscal decentralization 0.02 -0.02* 0.01 0.02* -0.01 -0.31
(0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.01) (0.02) (0.27)
Fiscal decentralization x 
Resource share
-0.48*** -0.01** -0.04** 0.01 -0.02* -0.04
(0.13) (0.005) (0.02) (1.31) (0.01) (0.04)
Adjusted R-squared 0.8272 0.7128 0.6417 0.8421  0.3802  0.358
Observations 30 120 161 21 94 74
Number of economies included 30 48 29 21 27 14
Table 4. Revisitng Main Results Using Restricted Samples of Developing and Developed Economies [OLS estimations]
Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by country in Regressions 2, 3, 5, 6, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. 
Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively.  Regressions 1, 2, 3 (4, 5, 6) replicate Regression 1 
of Table 2 and Regressions 1 and 3 of Table 3, respectively, using a restricted sample of developing (developed) economies; unlike the 
benchmark specifications, the interaction terms of the resource share measure with fractionalization and rule of law in the cross-
sectional cases, and the measure of democracy together with its interaction with the price-based resource measure in the panel cases, 
are excluded, to avoid multicollinearity; this increases the sample in the panel cases, compared to that in the benchmark specifications. 
For description and sources of variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see Appendix.
Developed economiesDeveloping economies
Dependent variable: Average 
annual growth in real per capita 
GDP
Note: Figure presents the correlation between the logarithm of land area (source: World Bank 
Indicators) and the cross-sectional fiscal decentralization measure (‘Vertical Imbalance’; source: 
World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators).
Figure 1. Fiscal decentralization and land area
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Note: Figure presents the Spearman Correlation between the GDP share of mineral output in 1972 
and that in 2008 (source: World Bank Indicators); ρ=0.81.
Figure 2. Relative rank of resource dependence: 1972 VS. 2008
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